



EMUN

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Hello, Delegates !

Welcome to the 10th Edition of EMUN

I, Udit Dedhiya, will be chairing the UNSC along with my Co-Chair, Sara Shirodkar.

My Co-Chair and I have attended several conferences over the years and we hope that our combined experience and knowledge shall make this one of the most memorable MUNs you will or shall attend.

The topics of our committee focus on the much-needed revaluation of the UN Peace Keeping Forces and The Standards for intervention in Armed Topics. Both these topics have been very carefully chosen, to not stimulate good debate but also too discuss and find solutions too two of the most important issues pressing against the international community.

Throughout the following pages we have outlined the topic thoroughly; however it will be necessary to conduct your own outside research to supplement the guide. Specifically, you will want to research your countries position with respect to the topics so that you are prepared to participate in debate.

Lastly, we'd like to take this opportunity to tell you how excited I am to be directing this committee. We can't wait until EMUN comes around and for our committee to get started! If any of you require any help or guidance please feel free to contact either of us we shall be glad to help you in any way we can.

Your Chairpersons,
Udit Dedhiya and Sara Shirodkar

Topic A - Reevaluating the Roles of UN DPKO

UN peacekeeping operations are deployed on the basis of mandates from the United Nations Security Council. Their tasks differ from situation to situation, depending on the nature of the conflict and the specific challenges it presents.

UN Charter

The Charter of the United Nations is the foundation document for all the UN work. The UN was established to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and one of its main purposes is to maintain international peace and security.

Peacekeeping, although not explicitly provided for in the Charter, has evolved into one of the main tools used by the United Nations to achieve this purpose.

The Charter gives the UN Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In fulfilling this responsibility, the Council may adopt a range of measures, including the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation.

- Chapter VI deals with the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”. UN peacekeeping operations have traditionally been associated with Chapter. However, the Security Council need not refer to a specific Chapter of the Charter when passing a resolution authorizing the deployment of a

UN peacekeeping operation and has never invoked Chapter VI.

- Chapter VII contains provisions related to “Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression’. In recent years, the Council has adopted the practice of invoking Chapter VII of the Charter when authorizing the deployment of UN peacekeeping operations into volatile post-conflict settings where the State is unable to maintain security and public order. The Security Council’s invocation of Chapter VII in these situations, in addition to denoting the legal basis for its action, can also be seen as a statement of firm political resolve and a means of reminding the parties to a conflict and the wider UN membership of their obligation to give effect to Security Council decisions.
- Chapter VIII of the Charter provides for the involvement of regional arrangements and agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security provided such activities are consistent with the purposes and principles outlined in Chapter I of the Charter.

Peacekeeping mandates

UN peacekeeping operations are deployed on the basis of mandates from the United Nations Security Council. Over the years, the range of tasks assigned to UN peacekeeping operations has expanded significantly in response to shifting patterns of conflict and to best address threats to international peace and security.

Although each UN peacekeeping

operation is different, there is a considerable degree of consistency in the types of mandated tasks assigned by the Security Council. Depending on their mandate, peacekeeping operations may be required to:

- Deploy to prevent the outbreak of conflict or the spill-over of conflict across borders;
- Stabilize conflict situations after a ceasefire, to create an environment for the parties to reach a lasting peace agreement;
- Assist in implementing comprehensive peace agreements;
- Lead states or territories through a transition to stable government, based on democratic principles, good governance and economic development.

Providing a systematic explanation of the establishment of a peacekeeping operation is challenging. Operations vary greatly in the way they are set-up depending on a variety of factors, the most important of which is political will. Thus, as UN peacekeeping's guiding *Capstone Doctrine* states, "In reality, there is no set sequence of events for establishing a United Nations peacekeeping operation". This lack of consistency and structure is in itself arguably problematic.

Generally, however, the following steps are taken in the establishment of an operation. Once the Security Council has provided a mandate for an operation the Secretary-General is responsible for choosing the Head of Mission to oversee the operation. The Head of Mission is usually a Special Representative of the Secretary-General. On top of this, there may also

be non-UN actors involved. These may include non-UN military formations from national or regional delegations, diplomatic and/or political actors, and NGOs such as the ICRC.

Since the first peacekeeping operation was deployed some sixty years ago, peacekeeping has developed to become one of the most important areas of UN responsibility. The rapid growth of UN peacekeeping has meant that this development has often happened in an *ad hoc* and relatively unguided manner. As a result mistakes and failures have occurred. It is therefore clear that the UN needs to implement some manner of reform, however the precise nature of this reform remains highly contested.

Critical Reforms Required for U.N. Peacekeeping

U.N. peacekeeping is now being conducted with unprecedented pace, scope, and ambition, and the increasing demands have revealed ongoing, serious flaws. Audits and investigations over the past few years have found substantial mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in procurement for U.N. peacekeeping and widespread incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeepers and civilian personnel.

U.N. peacekeeping operations can be useful and successful if employed with an awareness of their limitations and weaknesses. This awareness is crucial because the demand for U.N. peacekeeping shows little indication of declining in the foreseeable future. Without fundamental reform, these

problems will likely continue and expand, undermining the U.N.'s credibility and ability to accomplish the key missions of maintaining international peace and security.

Since 1990, the Security Council has approved more than 40 new peace operations, half of them since 2000. These post-1990 operations have often involved mandates that go beyond traditional peacekeeping in scope, purpose, and responsibilities. Moreover, these missions have often focused on quelling civil wars, reflecting a change in the nature of conflict from interstate conflict between nations to intrastate conflict within nations.

This expansion of risk and responsibilities was justified by pointing out the international consequences of each conflict, such as refugees fleeing to neighboring countries or widespread conflict and instability. As a result, from a rather modest history of monitoring cease-fires, demilitarized zones, and post-conflict security, U.N. peace operations have expanded to include multiple responsibilities, including more complex military interventions, civilian police duties, human rights interventions, reconstruction, overseeing elections, and post-conflict reconstruction. While such actions may be justified in some cases, they represent a dramatic shift from earlier doctrine.

The size and expense of U.N. peace operations have risen to unprecedented levels. Recent peace-keeping missions involve some 93,000 uniformed personnel from 118

countries, including over 79,000 troops, over 2,000 military observers, and about 11,000 police personnel. More than 20,000 U.N. volunteers and other international and local civilian personnel are employed in these operations, and more than 2,000 military observers, police, international and local civilians, and U.N. volunteers are involved in the recent political or peace-building missions.

In total, at the end of June 2009, the DPKO was overseeing more than 115,000 personnel involved in U.N. peacekeeping, political, or peace-building operations, including international and local civilian personnel and U.N. volunteers. The DPKO is currently overseeing the deployment of more uniformed personnel than any single nation, except the United States, has outside of its borders.

The U.S. contributes the largest share of funding for peacekeeping operations. All permanent members of the Security Council—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—are charged a premium above their regular U.N. assessment rate. Specifically, the U.S. is assessed 22 percent of the U.N. regular budget, but just under 26 percent of the U.N. peacekeeping budget for 2009. China is assessed 3.15 percent of the peacekeeping budget; France, 7.4 percent; Russia, 1.4 percent; and the U.K., 7.8 percent. Thus, the U.S. is assessed more than all other permanent members combined. Japan (16.6 percent) and Germany (8.6 percent) rank second and third in assessments, even though they are not permanent members of the

Security Council.

Although the U.S. and other developed countries regularly provide transportation (particularly airlift) and logistic support for U.N. peacekeeping, many developed countries with trained personnel and other essential resources are reluctant to participate directly in U.N. peace operations.

However, the broadening of U.N. peace operations into nontraditional missions-such as peace enforcement-and their inability to garner broad international support in terms of troop contributions, logistics support, and funding raise legitimate questions as to whether the U.N. should be engaging in the current number of missions and whether these situations are best addressed through the U.N. or through regional, multilateral, or *ad hoc* efforts.

Mismanagement, Fraud, and Corruption

The U.N. has proved to be susceptible to mismanagement, fraud, and corruption, as illustrated by numerous recent instances of mismanagement and corruption unearthed by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and the now defunct U.N. Procurement Task Force. These problems have also plagued U.N. peacekeeping.

The absence of a truly independent inspector general at the U.N. is an ongoing problem. It underscores the U.N.'s irresponsibility in refusing to extend the mandate of the independent U.N. Procurement Task Force, which was taking great strides

in uncovering mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in U.N. procurement. The U.N. needs more independent oversight, not less, especially since U.N. procurement has increased rapidly along with the number and size of peacekeeping missions. According to the U.N. Department of Field Support, total value for U.N. peacekeeping procurement transactions was \$1.43 billion in 2008. If this procurement follows previous patterns revealed by Procurement Task Force and OIOS investigations, some 40 percent (nearly \$600 million) could be tainted by fraud.

Sexual Misconduct

In recent years, there have been numerous reports of U.N. personnel committing serious crimes and sexual misconduct, from rape to the forced prostitution of women and young girls. The most notorious of these reports involved the U.N. Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). U.N. personnel have also been accused of sexual exploitation and abuse in Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, Congo, Guinea, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan.

The alleged perpetrators include U.N. military and civilian personnel from a number of U.N. member states involved in peace operations and from U.N. funds and programs. The victims are often refugees-many of them children-who have been terrorized by years of war and look to U.N. peacekeepers for safety and protection. In addition to the horrible mistreatment of those under U.N. protection, sexual exploitation and

abuse undermine the credibility of U.N. peace operations and need to be addressed through an effective plan and commitment to end abuses and ensure accountability.

In 2005, Prince Zeid Ra'ad Al-Hussein of Jordan, the U.N. Secretary-General's adviser on sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeepers, submitted his report with recommendations on how to address the sexual abuse problem, including imposing a uniform standard of conduct, conducting professional investigations, and holding troop-contributing countries accountable for the actions of their soldiers and for enforcing proper disciplinary action. In June 2005, the General Assembly adopted the recommendations in principle, and some of the recommendations have been implemented. Contact and discipline teams are now present in most U.N. peacekeeping missions, and troops are now required to undergo briefing and training on behavior and conduct.

Tragically, this does not seem to have addressed the problem adequately. In May 2008, the international nonprofit Save the Children accused aid workers and peacekeepers of sexually abusing young children in war zones and disaster zones in Ivory Coast, southern Sudan, and Haiti, and it claims that the perpetrators have largely gone unpunished. U.N. peacekeepers were deemed most likely to be responsible for abuse. According to a report issued by Save the Children, "Children as young as six are trading sex with aid workers and peacekeepers in exchange for food, money, soap and, in very few cases, luxury items such as mobile phones."

Moreover, despite the U.N.'s announcement of a "zero tolerance" policy on sexual abuse and other actions to reduce misconduct and criminality among peacekeepers, the perpetrators are rarely punished, as was revealed in a January 2007 news report on U.N. abuses in southern Sudan. The standard memorandum of understanding between the U.N. and troop contributors appropriately grants troop-contributing countries jurisdiction over military members who participate in U.N. peace operations, but little is done if these countries fail to investigate or punish those who are guilty of such crimes.

A Political Problem

The problems of mismanagement, corruption, and misconduct cry out for fundamental reform of the U.N. peacekeeping structure to improve accountability and transparency. However, corruption, mismanagement, and sexual misconduct by U.N. peacekeepers are not the only problems with U.N. peacekeeping.

The other problem is a political problem. In general, the U.N. and its member states have accepted the principle that U.N. peace operations should not include a mandate to enforce peace out-side of limited circumstances and should focus instead on assisting countries in shifting from conflict to a negotiated peace and from peace agree-ments to legitimate governance and development. As noted in the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*:

The United Nations does not wage war. Where enforcement action is required, it has consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing States, with the authorization of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter.

A recent DPKO report noted,

The single most important finding of the Brahimi report was that UN peacekeeping can only succeed as part of a wider political strategy to end a conflict and with the will of the parties to implement that strategy.... In active conflict, multinational coalitions of forces or regional actors operating under UN Security Council mandates may be more suitable.

In other cases, such as the U.N. missions in Cyprus and the Western Sahara, the U.N. presence is simply a historical palliative. The peacekeepers' presence does not seem to have contributed to resolving the decades-long political standoff. Instead, the missions continue out of inertia or because the parties to the conflict have requested that they continue. Yet the U.N. presence may be contributing to the situation's intractability by providing the parties with an excuse not to resolve what is largely a political problem.

Creation of Peacekeeping Forces

UN peacekeeping operations have also been plagued with leadership issues in the past due to rather complicated chain of commands. Overcoming these leadership issues must become a high priority area of reform for the UN. Although the writing of the

Capstone Doctrine was in some ways an attempt to do this, it simply did not go far enough in order to be effective in the field. It may have cleared up any ambiguity in the theoretical command structure of peacekeeping operations, however as long as UN peacekeeping operations remain as splintered and segregated as they currently are, this kind of theoretical guidance is unlikely to ever be enough.

Despite being sometimes portrayed as an independent actor, the UN is and always will be a multifaceted, multilateral organization. Indeed, the multilateral nature of UN peacekeeping is in many ways one of its strengths, especially in regards to the legitimacy and accountability of its operations.

However, this does not mean that there are not reforms, which could be implemented to overcome some of the negative consequences of UN's multilateral nature.

The creation of a standing UN peacekeeping force is certainly not a new idea. It has been debated in some form since the very beginning of the UN. It must be noted that proponents for the establishment of a standing force generally focus on the benefits it would have to peacekeeping issues such as the speed of deployment and the levels of professionalism and training of soldiers. These issues have not been discussed in this essay, however they are undoubtedly important areas of reform for UN peacekeeping. The benefits the creation of a standing army would have on the leadership, command and control structures of UN peacekeeping have often been overlooked.

Peacekeepers' Gender Proportion

Only 2.3 percent of the 88,661 military peacekeepers serving in 17 different missions are women, whereas in 2008 they made up 2.18 percent of military contingents. Approximately 8.2 percent of the 13,221 UN police are women, a figure that jumped from 6.5 percent in April.

The advantages of a strong presence of female peacekeeper in conflict and post-conflict zones include creating a safer space for girls and women who have suffered sexual violence, said Marianne Mollman, advocacy director of women's rights at Human Rights Watch, a global watchdog organization.

In 2000, Resolution 1325 of the UN Security Council called on the Secretary-General to "progress on gender mainstreaming throughout peacekeeping missions and all other aspects related to women and girls."

Subsequent Security Council resolutions outlined more comprehensive methods for using peacekeeping missions to protect women and girls from sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict zones, including increasing the number of women peacekeepers.

"A lot of member states are beginning to understand that when it comes to peacekeeping missions, you really do need to have both women and men in the military and police equally represented. The first all-female Formed Police Unit (FPU), deployed in Liberia in 2007, made a substantial difference to the women victimized in

rampant sexual violence during the country's civil war," said Lea Angela Biason, a DPKO gender affairs associate.

The UN Mission in Liberia noted that after the deployment of Indian female peacekeepers, the percentage of women in the national police force rose from 13 percent in 2008 to 15 percent in 2009. Women police were often placed in the front lines in riots, as they can reportedly help calm raucous crowds, Biason said, and the presence of women in uniform also appeared to encourage Liberian women to report instances of sexual violence.

The UN Secretariat plans to send an all-female FPU from Bangladesh to Haiti, where reports of sexual violence in the camps for internally displaced persons abound.

Nigeria deploys the second-greatest number of female peacekeepers - 349 women out of 4,951 troops - and has announced plans to send an all-female FPU to Liberia.

In Darfur, western Sudan, 136 female police officers from Ghana, Gambia, Tanzania, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Bangladesh have joined the UN Mission there since February, Biason said. Nearly 200 female police officers in Rwanda recently passed a test qualifying them for deployment.

Conclusion

U.N. peacekeeping operations can be useful and successful if entered into with an awareness of their limitations and weaknesses. This awareness is

crucial because the demand for U.N. peacekeeping shows little indication of declining in the foreseeable future. Moreover, the unprecedented pace, scope, and ambition of U.N. peacekeeping operations have revealed numerous serious flaws that need to be addressed. Without fundamental reform, these problems will likely continue and expand, undermining the U.N.'s credibility and ability to maintain international peace and security.

Further Reading:

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/pkmandates.shtml>

<https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/peacekeeping/peacekeeping-reform/49149.html>

<http://www.e-ir.info/2011/07/18/united-nations-peacekeeping-and-the-question-of-reform/>

<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/09/critical-reforms-required-for-un-peacekeeping>

Topic B: Standards for Armed Intervention in Conflict Areas

Introduction

Formed in the wake of the horrors of World War II and the Holocaust, the United Nations took as its primary mission the maintenance of international peace and security. Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has used this mandate to justify intervention in cases such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. In the case of domestic conflicts, however, the Council has generally deferred to Article 2.7 of the Charter, which asserts that "...nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. "Intervention is often defined as the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or a group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied. Despite there being no general or international consensus regarding the cases or standards through which a nation or group of nations have the right to intervene in another state, it does have some general characteristics –

- Intervention involves the threat and use of military forces as a central feature.
- It is an intervention in the sense that it entails interfering in the internal affairs of a state by sending military forces into the territory or airspace of a

- sovereign state that has not committed an act of aggression against another state
- The intervention is in response to situations that do not necessarily pose direct threats to states' strategic interests, but instead is motivated by humanitarian objectives.

External military intervention for human protection purposes has been controversial both when it has happened – as in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo – and when it has failed to happen, as in Rwanda. For some the new activism has been a long overdue internationalization of the human conscience; for others it has been an alarming breach of an international state order dependent on the sovereignty of states and the inviolability of their territory. For some, again, the only real issue is ensuring that coercive interventions are effective; for others, questions about legality, process and the possible misuse of precedent loom much larger. Since the dawn of the new millennia, two concerns were of utmost importance to the military and political agenda of various countries in world: humanitarian intervention and terrorism. Disasters like the genocide in Rwanda, which had a death toll of approximately 800,000, have shocked our conscience and made us question the moral fabric and the necessity of the standards of intervention.

Definition of Key Terms

Humanitarian Intervention

Humanitarian Intervention is the use of, or the threat to use of, force across state borders by a state (or group of states), aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights possessed by and bestowed on individuals, other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state whose territory the force is being applied⁴

Political Intervention (Politically Motivated Intervention)

As the name suggests, political interventions are those foreign interventions that find their roots or causes seated in matters or have their agendas 'politically motivated' i.e.: the true reason for the intervention is not to stop the gross human rights violations and/or atrocities being committed on the civilians but to fulfil the aggressing country's own political agenda.

Responsibility to Protect (RtoP/R2P)

RtoP is a norm (please note, it is not a law), formulated in 2005, according to which the use of military force shall be a last resort by the international community, and even so, the intervention must take place in accordance with the UN Charter. (This concept and its intricacies are explained in detail below)

Types of Intervention –

UN Authorized Interventions

Most states prefer to secure UN authorization before using force for humanitarian purposes, and agree that the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,

can authorize military action in response to severe atrocities and other humanitarian emergencies that it concludes constitute a threat to peace and security.

The understanding of what constitutes threats to international peace has been radically broadened since the 1990s to include such issues as mass displacement, and the UN Security Council has authorized use of force in situations that many states would have previously viewed as “internal” conflicts.

Unauthorized Interventions

In several instances, states or groups of states have intervened with force, and without advance authorization from the UN Security Council, at least in part in response to alleged extreme violations of basic human rights. Fairly recent examples include the intervention after the Gulf War to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq as well as NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, amongst others.

The tension between the organization’s two aims – preservation of peace and respect for national sovereignty – became painfully obvious in 1994, when members of the Hutu ethnic group massacred more than 800,000 Tutsis in Rwanda, despite the presence of UN peacekeeping forces. The leaders of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) claimed that their mandate from the UN was unclear about authorizing the use of force to protect civilians. Ten years after the genocide, then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said that, “...the international-community failed

Rwanda and that must leave us always with a sense of bitter regret.” Since the Rwandan genocide, the UN has adopted a more robust interpretation of Chapter VII of the Charter, which deals with the Security Council’s right and responsibilities in counteracting, ‘threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.’

In 2005, the organization established the Responsibility to Protect initiative (RtoP), a set of principles to guide UN action in humanitarian crises. Acting on the assumption that sovereignty constitutes a responsibility to the governed, the RtoP states that the international community, although always in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter – may use military force as a last resort in cases where states, “...manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” In keeping with the RtoP, in 2011 members of the Security Council approved UNSC Resolution 1973, which created a no fly zone over Libya - and authorized the use of all means, short of foreign occupation, by member states in order to protect civilians during the Libyan Civil War of 2011.

This resolution became the justification for an eight-month long, multi state military intervention, largely under the auspices of NATO. Although the Libyan intervention was largely successful from a military standpoint, facilitating the ouster of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s government by rebel forces, the campaign raised a variety of question relating to exactly when and where international military

intervention is called for. For every Gaddafi, there is a Saddam Hussein – whose deposition in 2003 at the hands of US forces was widely regarded as illegal, despite the atrocities committed by the former Iraqi president. For every National Transitional Council (the coalition of anti Gaddafi forces that served as the “political face” of the Libyan -uprising), there is a National League for Democracy (the Burmese opposition movement, led by Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi), which seeks to overthrow a similarly autocratic government.

Given the evolution of international norms and humanity’s growing interconnectedness at the global level, the need for unambiguous standards regarding armed humanitarian intervention is clear.

Key Issues

In discussing this topic, there are three main issues to consider. The first is the UN Charter itself, which remains the final word in determining what constitutes a “legal” intervention; the Right to Protect represents only the current norms of the international community. Moreover, neither of these documents specify what makes one instance of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity more deserving of international attention than another. Any attempt to clarify the standards for intervention must adhere to those parts of the Charter, which explicitly recognize the territorial integrity, and political independence of all states. Member states must also be aware of the dangers of creating pretexts for

aggression, in direct opposition to the chief aim of the UN.

The second issue is the nature of the conflicts in question. There are plenty of instances where a state is failing to protect, or even actively committing violence against, its citizens: which of these demand military intervention? Which should be left alone? What is the procedure for assessing such situations? When can the UN safely say that it has exhausted all non-military options? In -formulating your recommendations, you must consider those cases in which a member of the Security Council has a stake in an ongoing domestic conflict – for example, the case of the Tibetan independence movement – in addition to those instances where a domestic conflict has the potential for international spillover, such as the recent Tunisian uprising. Council members should also think about other cases in which standards they develop might be used to justify intervention. Is a nation that knowingly pollutes its water supply as culpable as one which fails to protect a persecuted minority from ethnic cleansing?

Finally, there is the question of means. The Security Council has at its disposal only finiteresources and limited political will. It would be logistically and politically impossible to intervene in every single case of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. If the Security Council agrees to take a more proactive stance toward humanitarian intervention, it must take steps to secure the physical and ideological resources to support such a decision over the long term. If, instead, the

Council adopts more stringent standards for intervention, it must consider the possibility that powerful nations may decide to take justice into their own hands, as the United States did during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Important questions worth considering include:

1. How can one distinguish between a politically motivated intervention and one that is not so?
2. Can an Intervention be justified?
3. How can countries be stopped from taking matters into their own hands?
4. Are trade embargoes, and economic sanctions enough to tackle conflicts?
5. How can an intervention, carrying an ulterior motive (i.e. – a war, extraction of natural wealth, etc) be identified, and prevented?
6. Relevance of R2P a norm and is there a need to make it a law?
7. Abuse of R2P
8. Are war crimes limited to domestically inclined problems?
9. How can the UNSC make the intervening parties more accountable?
10. How should the UNSC ensure that such actions if undertaken by countries are in compliance with existing international laws and frameworks like the Geneva and Hague Conventions?
11. Should or should not the UNSC have the final word in reference to the intervention?
12. Questions pointed in the "Key Issues" section and the three conflicts therein.

Additional Research Links

<http://www.usip.org/publications/ethics-armed-humanitarian-intervention>

<http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/dilemma-humanitarian-intervention/p16524>

<http://www.cfr.org/search/?Ntt=humanitarian+intervention&submit.x=0&submit.y=0&submit=GO>
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf

<http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=49457>

http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~ihu355/Home_files/is%20hi%20legal.pdf

<http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/rgoodman/pdfs/RGoodmanHumanitarianInterventionPretextsforWar.pdf>

<http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/topics/peace-and-security.htm>

http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/4094~v~Maintaining_International_Peace_and_Security__A_Summit_Meeting_of_the_UN_Security_Council.pdf

<http://arabnews.com/opinion/article545973.ece>

<http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/09/the-law-of-the-jungle.html>

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